Does Agent-Causation Theory Explain Free Agency? by Xu, Xiangdong
Does Agent-Causation Theory Explain Free Agency? 
Xu Xiangdong 
(Institute of Foreign Philosophy, Peking University) 
 
 
Elsewhere I have shown that agent-causation approach to free agency recently 
advocated by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clarke provide no convincing account 
of free agency, or that this kind of approach would be incoherent if it was to say 
something interesting about free agency.1 In this paper, I will not repeat my arguments 
against this kind of approach which I have developed in those works. I will instead 
focus on another similar attempt put forward by E. J. Lowe.2 I will show that Lowe’s 
arguments for libertarian free agency on the basis of his theory of agent-causation and 
personal agency are by and large unsuccessful. If I am correct, no approach of this 
kind is adequate for making sense of our free agency. In fact, so long as an 
agent-causation theorist had been preoccupied with a libertarian conception of free 
will, it would be impossible for him to work out any reasonably acceptable account of 
our free agency, as I will once again show in the paper.  
As far as I can see, Lowe’s argument for libertarian free agency is based on three 
claims.3 First, agent-causation is more fundamental than event-causation. In fact, on 
his view, agent-causation is not only conceptually but also ontologically priori to 
event-causation. Second, free actions are completely uncaused—but they need not on 
that account be deemed to be merely random or chance occurrences. Third, a rational 
agent’s reasons for action are never causes of the agent’s actions. This paper is thus 
divided into four sections: each one in the first three sections is devoted to examining 
each claim advanced by Lowe. In the final section, I will, on the basis of my 
discussion, attempt to offer some suggestions about how free agency should be 
conceived.   
 
I 
 
Following Lowe’s lead, in speaking of causation, I will be only talking about singular 
causation without inquiring the question of whether any singular causation must be 
backed up by some law, no matter whether we take a law to possess some 
necessitating effect. In other words, just as Lowe, I will completely satisfy myself 
with some intuitive understanding of the notion of causation without going deep into 
more details of the metaphysics of causation.4 A singular event-causation can be 
                                                        
1 Xiangdong Xu, Making Sense of Free Will (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2008), especially chapter 8, and 
Xiangdong Xu (2007), “On the Incoherence of Agent-Causation Theory”, Mind and Computation, Vol.1: 46-69. I 
say that this kind of approach is incoherent mainly in the sense that any plausible understanding it can offer of free 
agency is acceptable to many compatibilists, or even relies on some compatibilist account of free agency. For 
O’Connor’s theory, see Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Metaphysics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); for Clarke’s theory, see Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Account of Free Will (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
2 E. J. Lowe, Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
3 Cf. Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 2. 
4 I have in some detail dealt with the metaphysics of causation in my Making Sense of Free Will, chapter 5.  
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formulated as, for example, “The explosion of the bomb caused the collapse of the 
bridge”. However, Lowe rejects this kind of approach to causation on the ground that 
events are causally impotent since causings, on his view, are a species of doings, or a 
species of actions in a broad sense of this notion. An event cannot be regarded as a 
cause because an event cannot do anything. By contrast, if only individual substances 
can be said to do something because they possess various properties, especially 
certain causal powers and liabilities they do have, it follows that only individual 
substances can be properly said to be causes of whatever have happened. For instance, 
in the example above mentioned, we should instead say that the bomb caused the 
collapse of the bridge, or that the bomber caused the collapse of the bridge if the agent 
in question was a human agent. If the notion of agent can be in a broad sense taken to 
include any individual substance possessing causal powers and liabilities, then Lowe’s 
view is simply that only agents are causes. Lowe does not deny that events may be 
said to be causes, and yet he insists that events can be said to be causes at best only in 
a loose and derivative sense. According to Lowe, every singular event-causal sentence 
is in fact analyzable into an existentially quantified agent-causal sentence. Such an 
analysis may take the following form:1 
 
(I) Event c caused event e if and only if there was some agent, A, and some 
manner of acting, X, such that c consisted in A’s Xing and A, by Xing, 
caused e.  
 
For example, the singular event-causal sentence that the explosion caused the collapse 
of the bridge can be analyzed into the agent-causal sentence that some agent (or some 
bomb), by exploding, caused the collapse of the bridge. 
Why does Lowe hold that agent-causation is both conceptually and ontologically 
primitive? Before answering the question, let me indicate a relevant point in the first 
place. An event cannot merely be understood as an occurrence in some specified 
spatial-temporal region if we need to distinguish an event from another one. If it is 
proper to say of an event that it caused another event, we have to say that it caused the 
latter event because of some property (properties) it instantiated. In this way an event 
may be construed as the instantiation of a certain property by something in some 
specified spatial-temporal region.2 Of course, if properties are not free-standing, that 
is to say, if any property must reside in some individual substance so that it is to exist 
or to be actualized, it is natural to say, for example, that it is because the bomb 
possessed the property of bringing about explosion that it caused the collapse of the 
bridge. It is true that the property of bringing about explosion may be embodied in 
different things, for example, in normal bomb or in nuclear bomb. However, I don’t 
think it quite necessary in attempting to explain why the bridge collapsed to say that 
some agent (or some substance), by acting in some manner, caused the collapse of the 
bridge. In fact, if we need to go on to ask why the agent (or the substance) acted in the 
                                                        
1 Cf. Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 136. 
2 Here I will not consider the possibility that something can instantiate many different properties at the same time. 
In this case we may adopt a more fine-grained notion of individuation with regard to an event. But this will not 
influence my argument.  
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manner which it did, we will have to say that it is because it possessed some specified 
property that it acted in that manner. It follows, in my view, that what figure in a 
singular causal relation are some causally relevant properties, which are indeed 
instantiated or embodied in two things or events that are, or can be taken to be, 
causally related. A bomb might not have caused a bridge to collapse if the bridge had 
been strong enough to resist the bomb’s power of explosion. Here I am not denying 
that substances can serve as causes. What I want to emphasize is instead that if 
substances can serve as causes, it is because they have possessed some causally 
relevant properties with regard to whatever occurred as effects. In other words, I take 
it to be among our intuitive conception of singular causation that A causes B to bring 
about some change in virtue of some causally relevant properties which they possess 
or instantiate, where A and B may be substances.1 Put this in another way, we may say 
that A’s instantiation of property P at t1 and in some given circumstance caused B’s 
instantiation of property Q at t2, where A and B can be, though need not to be, the 
same substance. Given the account, neither agent-causation nor event-causation is 
fundamental in the causal structure of the world—it is some underlying properties that 
constitute the foundation of causal changes and causal interactions. It seems that 
Lowe can accept the interpretation of singular causation I just offered since he 
occasionally mentions that we may attempt to analyze agent-causation in terms of 
event-causation in this way:2 
 
(II) Agent A caused event e if and only if: (1) there was some event, x, such that 
x involved A and x caused e, (2) x involved A just in case x consists in some 
change in one or more of the properties of A.         
 
Here it does not matter whether the properties in question are intrinsic properties or 
relational properties of A so long as the change in A is change in property or 
properties. Even though it makes sense to say that an agent caused some event by 
acting in a certain way, it is sufficient for sustaining the interpretation of singular 
causation under consideration to indicate that it is because the agent possessed some 
property or some property change had occurred in it that it acted in the way it did. 
Then, in order to defend his claim that agent-causation is both conceptually and 
ontologically primitive, Lowe has to show that neither agent-causation is reducible to 
event-causation, nor can it be explained in terms of the fact that an agent possessed 
some property (or properties) or some property change has occurred in it.   
Lowe does attempt to demonstrate his claim by appealing to two arguments. The 
first argument is an epistemological one to the effect that agent-causation has some 
conceptually priority. What is unique to Lowe’s position on agent-causation is that he 
                                                        
1 The understanding of singular causation shows that I am disposed to adopt what is called ‘dispositional 
essentialism’. I suspect that Lowe has, though not quite explicitly, endorsed this view in explaining the notion of 
substance-causation. For some important accounts of dispositional essentialism, see, for example, George Bealer 
(1987), “The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism”, Philosophical Perspectives 1: 289-365; Brian Ellis 
and C. Lierse (1994), “Dispositional Essentialism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 27-45; Brian Ellis, 
Scientific Essentialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); G. Molnar, Power: A Study in 
Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); S. Mumford, Laws in Nature (London: Routledge, 2004).  
2 Cf. Lowe, Personal Agency, pp. 123-124.  
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does not hold that the notion of agent-causation is merely restricted to rational or 
animate agents. If agent-causation could only be exercised by rational or animate 
agents, the thesis that event-causation is reducible to agent-causation would entail the 
highly implausible doctrine that nothing is caused to occur in the world save through 
the agency of rational or animate beings. Lowe is quire right to realize that he could 
not accept such a doctrine. However, he goes on to claim that “the notion of agent 
causation is at least conceptually prior to that of event causation, even if it is doubted 
whether event causation is reducible to agent causation”.1 Lowe’s argument for this 
point rests on the idea that while a passive being is incapable of distinguishing 
between causal sequences of events and purely coincidental sequences of events, a 
creature that is active and probably conscious as well can make such a distinction by 
actively intervening in and manipulating the course of nature.2 However, I don’t 
believe that the argument has established the conceptual priority of agent-causation. 
My reason is that even though the ability to intervene in and manipulate the course of 
nature so as to distinguish between causal sequences of events and non-causal 
sequences of events can be thought to manifest some kind of agent-causation, the 
possibility that we can do so has implied that we have possessed the notion of 
event-causation in the first place. Moreover, it is not conceptually impossible that we 
would never make use of the ability in question even if we had it.  
Lowe’s second argument is based on his analysis of causative action verbs and 
basic actions. Even though I don’t believe that mere language analysis can reveal 
something significant about metaphysics, it is worth seeing whether Lowe’s argument 
under consideration has succeeded. Many transitive verbs of action, as Lowe 
observers, have quite specific causal implications. But more than this, they also 
suggest that by what manner the agent caused the kind of effect which that verb 
implies. For example, in saying that someone killed another person, we are not merely 
saying that the first person caused the death of the second person, but we are also 
saying how he caused the death of the latter—that is to say, the verb ‘kill’ also implies 
the specific manner by which some kind of effect is caused by the agent. However, 
there is a special class of action which seems to defy description in these means-end 
terms, and this kind of action is so-called ‘basic action’. This kind of action is basic in 
the sense that the agent immediately performed such an action—he did not do it by 
any means at all. One example of this kind is a human agent’s spontaneous movement 
of one of his own limbs, and another example is one’s having waved his hand. It is 
unclear to me that in what sense such actions can be counted as actions in proper since 
we normally hold that in the case of human agents, action is intentional: it is always 
the case that an action was taken in order to fulfill some end or goal which the agent 
desires to achieve. In this case, description of any action always involves using 
means-end terms. I might spontaneously wave my hand to someone in the street, and I 
did this because I recognized that he was one of my friends whom I had not seen for a 
long time, and I waved my hand in order to draw his attention of me, or simply 
showed my good-will to him. It is noticeable that action can be expressive: I may take 
                                                        
1 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 134. 
2 Lowe makes it explicit that his argument is indebted to G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding 
(London: Routledge, 1971), pp. 60ff. 
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an action not in order to fulfill a separate end, but to express an end which is intrinsic 
to the action. On the other hand, if, after some reflection or introspection, I come to 
find out that I had no reason to wave my hand despite the fact that I did wave my 
hand some minutes ago, I will certainly take the spontaneous movement to be 
unintelligible to me.  
The reason why Lowe so insists on the possibility of basic action is that he takes 
this kind of action to provide decisive support for the irreducibility of agent-causation. 
However, his argument falls short of establishing what he intends to claim. It is not 
difficult to see that if an action is non-basic, which means that it makes sense to 
describe it by the use of means-end terms, then agent-causation involving it can be 
analyzed according to (II) above mentioned. For example, the singular agent-causal 
statement that a human agent A killed someone else B by poisoning can be analyzed 
into the event-causal statement that A’s administration of the poison to B caused B’s 
death. However, according to Lowe, basic actions cannot be analyzed in terms of (II), 
which means that basic actions typically exemplify irreducible agent-causation. Basic 
actions are basic because it is said that such an action is directly caused by the agent 
in the sense that there is no suitable event involving the agent when such an action 
occurs. I don’t believe that this claim can make coherent sense, which will be 
discussed later on when I deal with Lowe’s account of free volition. Here it is 
interesting to note that Lowe tries to argue in support of the claim in question by 
saying that there must be basic actions if agents perform any action at all. It is said 
that “if every action had a means-end structure, this would apparently generate a 
vicious infinite regress, whereby the means of each action is compelled to be the end 
of another”.1 I am not sure that I can fully understand this view. When I intend to do 
something, I do it in order to achieve some specified end. I cannot see how the means 
of the action must become the end of another action unless my end-in-view is to be 
fulfilled by my performing a series of intermediate means. In this case some means 
may also be a middle end in the sense that I will have to adopt some means M1 in 
order to achieve my end-in-view, and I will have to adopt another means M2 to 
achieve M1, and so on. However, so long as an end can be achieved by a finite series 
of means, there is no possibility of vicious infinite regress. On the other hand, if I 
come to realize that some end I want to get cannot be achieved in this way, it is 
rational for me to give up the end at least in the present time. In fact, a lot of ends I 
take actions to achieve can be separate in the sense that means used to achieve them 
have no intrinsic connection of any kind, and in this case there is no infinite regress 
involved.  
Lowe asserts that this kind of infinite regress can be avoided and thus analysis (II) 
can still be sustained in the case of inanimate agents. This could be true, and yet the 
account he offers is seriously flawed. Lowe argues that in this case, not all actions 
demand description in terms of causative action verbs. For example, an inanimate 
object can push or pull another object and in doing so it causes the latter object to 
move in certain ways. Suppose we go on to ask by what manner such an inanimate 
agent can push or pull another object. Then our answer is likely to make reference to 
                                                        
1 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 126. 
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behavior of the agent which is not properly described in terms of causative action 
verbs. We may say, for instance, that an inanimate agent can push another object by 
rolling into it or by falling on to it. According to Lowe, ‘roll’ and ‘fall’ are not 
causative action verbs, and thus we have no reason to suppose that the actions which 
they describe have a means-end structure. In other words, it is inappropriate to ask by 
what manner an inanimate object rolled into or fell on to another object. Lowe is right 
to see that the first object’s behavior may be subject to causal explanation, for 
example, by referring to another object’s action upon it we can explain why it rolled 
or fell. However, if the object had no causally relevant properties with regard to 
another object’s action upon it, it would not have rolled or fell. A roll of cotton might 
not have rolled into or fell on to another object so as to push the latter to move in a 
certain manner, even though it had been hit on by a moving iron ball. If causal 
interaction between two objects depends on or consists in some causally relevant 
properties possessed by them, ‘roll’ and ‘fall’ are not less qualified for serving as 
causative action verbs than ‘push’ or ‘pull’.  
 
II 
 
Thus far I have shown, or I hope so, that Lowe’s argument for the primitiveness of 
agent-causation is unsuccessful. However, human action is quite different from and 
more complicated than any movement caused by any inanimate object or occurring in 
such an object. Lowe attempts to show that there is really irreducible agent-causation 
at least in the case of human basic actions. As indicated in the first section, a leading 
motivation for adopting agent-causation approach to free agency comes from a 
libertarian worry. The worry is, in Lowe’s words, this: 
 
If all human agency is ultimately just a matter if one event’s causing another, then, since the 
causal history of the events supposedly involved in any instance of human agency will 
plausibly be traceable back, through prior events, to times before the agent’s birth, we seem 
to lose all sense of the agent’s being genuinely responsible for…his or her own actions.1  
 
However, whether moral responsibility must demand what Robert Kane calls 
‘ultimate responsibility’2 and thus ask for endorsing a libertarian conception of free 
will is exactly not a simple question. Any plausible answer to the question will be, in 
the very least, dependent on whether the libertarian conception of free will is itself 
intelligible and whether compatibilists cannot give any acceptable account of free 
agency required by moral responsibility.3 Thus it is not sufficient to argue in support 
of some agent causation-based approach to free agency and moral responsibility 
merely asserting that neither compatibilism nor Kane’s event-causal indeterminism 
can adequately tackle the question of moral responsibility. Put this more precisely, if 
ultimate responsibility must be postulated as a condition for any morally responsible 
action, then advocates of agent-causation approach must be able to explain how this 
                                                        
1 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 128. 
2 Cf. Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
3 I have adequately dealt with these questions in my Making Sense of Free Will. 
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kind of approach meets the requirement of ultimate responsibility. There is no reason 
to think, as I will show, that the question can be solved merely on the basis of our 
phenomenological experience of free choice since this kind of experience can be 
delusive or illusive, as I will explain in due course.  
Lowe makes it explicit that the only prospect of solving the problem of free will 
is by appealing to the notion of agent-causation. As I said, unless Lowe has been able 
to show in a positive and coherent1 way that the appeal in question can explain how a 
human agent can take ultimate responsibility for actions or choices the agent has 
made, he will not have established the claim just mentioned. What is crucial to 
Lowe’s argument is the idea that in the most fundamental sense of the term ‘cause’, 
substance causation is primitive since it is substances, not events, that possess causal 
powers and liabilities. I would not deny that substances can be causes if by this we 
mean that a substance possesses causal powers and liabilities because of some 
properties it does have. Here it does not matter which properties can be causally 
relevant so long as causal powers and liabilities are (or can be regarded as) grounded 
in properties. Even though some substance, for example, an atom of some kind, is 
regarded as indivisible, it will be manifesting its causal power because of some 
property (or properties) it has if it does have causal interaction with another object. 
Accordingly, if an event can be understood as instantiation of some property or 
property change in some specified spatial-temporal region, it is likewise proper to say 
that events can be causes.2 Substances can have a special status of serving as causes 
merely because a substance is supposed to consist of some specific properties perhaps 
together with some formal structure which, though, can result from some other 
properties. Viewed in this way, there is no asymmetry between substances and events 
insofar as causal powers and liabilities are concerned. Then, what is Lowe’s reason 
for declaring that substance causation is primary? The reason is exactly drawn from 
Lowe’s commitment to the dependency thesis (as I call it from now on) of basic 
actions on agent-causation and some form of volitionism. Let me explain. 
It is interesting to note that from the first-personal point of view, whenever I 
have performed an action, it is the ‘I’, the subject of action, who performs the action. 
If an action I have performed was not made under coercion, impulsion, or 
manipulation, or something like this, I can identify myself as the author of the 
action—I can say that the action was performed by exercising my own agency. There 
is no need to deny that an agent can make positive contribution to the occurrence of 
an action. Nor is it odd or unnatural to say that an agent caused an event to happen if 
the event was originated from his own agency. However the notions of belief and 
desire are to be understood, about which I will say more later on, it is among our 
ordinary understanding of action that an agent performs some action X because he 
desires to get Y, and he believes that he will be able to get Y by doing X. If this is 
                                                        
1 I say “coherent” because I suspect that any acceptable account of ultimate responsibility the agent-causation 
theorist can offer can be accommodated in a reasonably acceptable compatibilist framework of free agency, or I 
will argue so.  
2 In fact, it is more proper or adequate to cite events rather than substances as causes in working out a causal 
explanation. It is not, of course, illegitimate to say that the bomb caused the collapse of the bridge. However, if a 
ten-years old schoolboy asks me why that is so, I will have to explain to him why or how a bomb can have the 
effect of causing a bridge to collapse by making reference to some property a bomb is thought to have.  
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correct, any action in proper will always involve a means-end structure. To entertain 
the view of action, we don’t need to deny that action is done through the agent’s 
exercise of his own agency. In other words, in this case, it is always meaningful and 
sometimes important (for example, for the purpose of attributing responsibility) to say 
that it is “I” who performed an action by exercising my own agency. It may be 
significant to mention one’s own agency, especially when an action is made after 
one’s rational deliberation. However, while agency can be attributed an indispensable 
role in the occurrence of an action, it seems to me it is wrong to claim that an action 
can be done with no purpose to be served by it if the action is itself intelligible to the 
agent. This is partly a matter of how to define human action, and yet it is an important 
question since it is concerned with the question of how human agency is to be best 
understood. It may be true that I can simply wave my hand, and yet the spontaneous 
movement occurred to me from which I cannot see any intention or reason to do it, 
despite the fact that I have done my best to try to find why I had ever waved my hand. 
In this circumstance, I will probably not take such a spontaneous movement to be an 
action, just as I do not regard the activities of my inner organs in my body as my 
actions, even if they happen in me.  
Now, according to Lowe, a non-basic action is whatever is done by way of some 
means, whereas a basic action is not caused by any means whatever, which amounts 
to saying that it is caused directly by the agent. Thus there is irreducible 
agent-causation in the case of basic actions. It is not difficult to see that if non-basic 
actions do have a means-end structure, then any such action is always done for 
something else, that is, the end or goal that is to be achieved by performing such an 
action. In the case of non-basic actions, it is always possible to explain why or how an 
agent performed an action by appealing to the fact that he desires to get some 
specified end or goal as well as some related means-end belief. Therefore, even if any 
action is agent-involved in the sense that an action would not have occurred had the 
agent have not exercised his own agency, it seems that in the case of non-basic actions, 
why or how an agent performed an action can be fully explained in terms of some 
mental states which he possesses. Given this, it is easily seen why Lowe intends to 
demonstrate the existence of irreducible agent-causation by appealing to the 
possibility of basic actions. For to say that an action is basic is to say that it is not in 
virtue of some event’s causing it that the agent has caused it to occur. Put this more 
precisely, in the case of a basic action, even though no prior event or combination of 
events was causally sufficient for its occurrence, it may be that the agent’s agency on 
this occasion was causally necessary for its occurrence. If prior events alone were not 
causally sufficient for the occurrence of the action, and if the action would not have 
occurred had the agent not imposed her agency, it seems that it is in virtue of the 
agent’s exercise of her own agency that the action came to occur. In other words, in 
the circumstance where the action was not causally determined by prior event, it 
occurred as a consequence of the agent’s agency if it did occur. Accordingly, the 
possibility of basic actions seems to give the libertarian all of what he wants: firstly, 
he can claim that the agent was genuinely responsible for the occurrence of the action 
since it is by means of imposing her own agency that she made the action to occur; 
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secondly, he can claim that the agent acted freely in directly causing the action to 
occur since her exercise of her own agency was not causally determined by prior 
events. 
However, the account provided by such libertarians as Lowe leaves a lot of 
ambiguities unclarified. Here I will only focus on two particularly relevant problems. 
First, is Lowe’s conception of basic actions genuinely intelligible? Second, in the 
circumstance where prior events alone were not causally sufficient for the occurrence 
of an action, even though it is supposed that the agent directly caused the action to 
occur by exercising her own agency, how can the fact by itself explain that the agent 
was both free and responsible with regard to the occurrence of the action?  
Let me firstly consider the first question. A basic action, recall, is that which is 
caused directly by the agent without having any prior event (or some combination of 
such events) to make that happen. The definition of basic actions seems to eliminate 
the possibility that a basic action is even determined by the agent through some 
mental state(s) he possesses in bringing about the action. However, this is not, in 
general, what Lowe has in mind in speaking of basic actions. If it is not the case that 
A’s causing e (where A is an agent, and e is an action) was itself caused by some prior 
event or events, it may be objected that A’s causing e is inexplicable, or simply a 
matter of pure chance. Lowe is acutely aware of the charge, and thus he indicates that 
A’s causing e may be subject solely to rational explanation, not to causal explanation. 
In other words, it is a genuine possibility that A caused e for a reason, while denying 
that anything caused A’s causing e. However, even if A caused e for a reason, it does 
immediately follow that nothing made causal contribution to A’s decision to cause e, 
which I take to be quite evident from our experience of rational deliberation. There 
are many factors, from outside and from inside, that can influence, and yet do not 
fully determined, my thinking about whether I am to adopt some action. In this case, 
if I have to act in a certain way on the specified occasion, I need to find out some 
reason (or some reasons) to make a decision. Wherever the reason comes from, so 
long as I endorse it as a decisive reason, it can be said that I act for the reason. 
However, without those prior factors (some of which may be events) I would perhaps 
have not found such a reason and acted on it: It is because those factors did not fully 
determine how I am to act that I was determined to seek some reason as the final 
determining ground of my action. In the sense they made causal contribution to my 
deliberation about how to act. It is true that in many circumstances, causal stimuli 
from the world don’t immediately determine our actions. In fact, if whatever we had 
done were determined by external causal factors, we would surely have no freedom. 
Instead, as rational agents, we can decide how to act, or whether or not to act, on the 
basis of our deliberation about relevant reasons and commitments. It is the awareness 
of our rational agency that makes us to realize that we can be, at least sometimes, the 
author of our actions, and thus can take responsibility for our actions.  
Even though Lowe does not, as it seems, deny that prior events can have causal 
influence on A’s causing e, he still insists that agent-causation cannot be reduced to 
event-causation at least in the case of basic actions.1 This may be understood as 
                                                        
1 “[An] advocate of irreducible agent causation need not say that no events whatever are (contributory) causes of 
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saying that if prior events can have causal influence on, though did not fully 
determine, A’s causing e, then it must be the case that it was in virtue of A’s imposing 
his own agency that A caused e. Furthermore, if A was freely exercising his own 
agency in causing e in this case, then appeal to irreducible agent-causation seems to 
tackle a dilemma with which we are faced in the problem of free will. The dilemma is 
this: given that an event must either have or lack a cause, on the one hand, if our 
choices are caused, then we lack genuine freedom; on the other hand, if our choices 
are uncaused and thus merely a matter of pure chance, then we lack genuine freedom. 
The dilemma does not come out without any presuppositions. For example, it 
obviously assumes that compatibilism is false and that we do have free will. However, 
even if the libertarian has succeeded in demonstrating the falsity of compatibilism, 
which I don’t believe to be true,1 he must be able to put forward some positive 
argument for the claim that we do have free will. It is not enough merely to indicate 
that the falsity of compatibilism entails the existence of a libertarian free will. Without 
such an argument it would entirely be ad hoc to assert that appeal to irreducible 
agent-causation solves the problem of free will. For, in any agent-causation approach 
to free agency, what is at issue is exactly how an agent can freely exercise his agency 
to cause an action directly. I am not denying, as I have made explicit in the above, that 
any human action (free action included) is brought about through one’s exercise of 
one’s own agency. What I am interested in inquiring is the question of how the 
agent-causation theorist can explain free agency merely on the basis of the notion of 
irreducible agent-causation. 
Suppose that my raising my arm is a basic action in the sense that there is 
nothing I do by which I cause my arm to rise. Then we may ask: how can it be that I 
cause my arm to rise without doing something else? An answer offered by Lowe is 
that I directly raise my arm by willing to raising my arm. To understand and evaluate 
this view, we need to introduce a distinction Lowe makes. Agent-causation theorists 
are disposed to think that a person’s actions (almost exclusively) consist in that 
person’s causing certain events. This view is indeed acceptable if human actions 
essentially involve one’s active exercise of one’s own agency. Lowe calls 
‘action-results’ the events which occur as a result of one’s actions. For example, 
raising one’s arm is an action in that it is a matter of one’s causing one’s arm to rise, 
and arm-rising is an action-result which may also be regarded as an event. According 
to the distinction, volitions, or acts of will, are not actions in that willing does not 
consist in causing something to happen, even if volitions can be seen as causes, in the 
event-causation sense, of all the action-results of our voluntary actions.  
This claim strikes me as somewhat puzzling, and yet let me to try to make sense 
of it. It may be true that if I will to raise my arm, then my arm rises—I need not do 
anything else to make my arm to rise. Since volitions simply consist in one’s 
exercising one’s power of will and by so doing causing certain events, volitions can 
be understood as causes of action-results, but not causes of actions, and thus are 
                                                                                                                                                               
the event that is caused by an agent in a case of ‘basic’ action: all that is being claimed is that it is not in virtue of 
its causation by any events whatever that the agent may be said to cause that event” (Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 
132). 
1 This is part of what I have done in my Making Sense of Free Will, especially chapters 3, 5 and 7. 
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constitutive of actions. This is, however, at best true in the case of basic actions since 
volitions can actually be causes of actions in the case of non-basic actions. If I will to 
murder you by poisoning you in order to get your money, then my willing to do so 
caused your death by taking the act of poisoning you. Here poisoning you was the 
proximal cause of your death, and yet it is also true that my willing to murder you 
caused my taking the act of poisoning you. Lowe holds that the will is a power or 
natural capability of agents in the sense that it can be exercised or manifested from 
time to time. However, he denies that the will is a causal power on the ground that its 
exercise does not consist in the causing of some relevant kind of effect, even though 
its exercise does normally have an action-result appropriate to the kind of action 
which the agent wills to perform. It is evident, at least from the example just 
mentioned, that in the case of non-basic actions, what Lowe calls ‘an action-result’ is 
exactly an action that is taken by the agent as means to some goal or end he entertains. 
To say that an action has a means-end structure is to say that the agent takes some 
specified means, which can be by itself an action, to fulfill some end he wants to get. 
If it is the case that I will something by doing something else, then how is it not the 
case that my willing something caused my doing something else? If my willing 
something was not a cause at all, how had my doing something else occurred?1 On 
the other hand, if the will is merely an executive power, rather than a causal power, as 
Lowe takes it, then it is proper to say that when I will something, I do something else 
by imposing my will so that I can get what I will. However, imposing one’s will so as 
to get what one wills has been taking an action. Lowe, of course, will not object to 
this point since volitions, on his view, are constitutive of actions in the sense that 
actions always involves one’s active exercise of one’s own agency. Now the question 
is this: in the case of so-called ‘basic actions’, how can a volition constitute a basic 
action without being the case that it also plays a causal role in the occurrence of the 
action?  
Lowe resist regarding the will as a species of causal power because he holds that 
what is distinctive of causal powers and liabilities is that they are powers to affect or 
be affected by objects in certain ways. If the will had been taken as a causal power, it 
would be hopeless, given Lowe’s commitment to libertarianism, to claim that an agent 
can freely will to do something. Basic actions, according to Lowe, exemplify the real 
possibility of free volitions. Surely I can exercise my will by willing to raise my arm 
even though my arm does not actually rise as a result of my so willing. This implies, 
according to Lowe, that “an exercise of my will consists, in itself, merely in my 
willing to do something, not in my actually doing that thing as a consequence of my 
so willing”.2 If freedom of the will is to be understood in this way, then my will is 
always free so long as I am not caused to exercise my will by any factor which I take 
to be external or foreign to me. This amounts to saying that whenever I feel being free 
in exercising my will, my will is free. Thus Lowe defines the will as a spontaneous 
power. However, the conception of a free will offered by Lowe falls into two serious 
troubles. On the one hand, it is not quite different from some compatibilist account of 
                                                        
1 The question makes sense at least to the extent that some counterfactual analysis of singular causation is correct.  
2 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 150. 
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free will, for example, the one advocated and developed by Harry Frankfurt.1 Let 
alone, Lowe’s account of free will merely on the basis of our phenomenological 
experience of free volition is far from satisfied as compared with Frankfurt’s one. On 
the other hand, it looks like as a completely ad hoc move to argue that our will can be 
free by defining the will as a spontaneous power.  
Of course, Lowe may have some substantive account of why or how the will can 
be spontaneous and thus free in the sense. As far as I can see, Lowe’s account depends 
on the attempt to combine an agent-causation approach to action with volitionism. 
Lowe initially observes that some inanimate objects can also have a spontaneous 
power. For example, radium has a spontaneous power to undergo radioactive decay in 
the sense that there is no prior event to cause its radioactive decay. It does not matter 
whether the claim is really true as Lowe thinks. What is important here is that Lowe 
does not actually think about the spontaneous power which a human will may have in 
this way. He is acutely aware of a difficulty, faced by such classical agent-causation 
theorists as R. M. Chisholm and Richard Taylor, to the effect that if it was not in 
virtue of something that the agent caused some event to happen, there would be no 
such thing as agent-causation per se.2 To avoid the difficulty, Lowe supposes that it is 
always by willing that we cause action-results to happen when we act freely, and that 
our volitions are causes of those events in the event-causation sense of ‘cause’. In this 
way Lowe can explain why different action-results come out when an agent has 
different volitions on different occasions. Then his view seems to take the form: 
willing can be both a constituent of a basic action and a cause of what happens as a 
result of that action. In other words, willing to do A seems to mean that deciding to do 
A by exercising one’s will and A occurs as a result of putting the decision into action. 
This seems nicely to capture Lowe’s central claim that agents as substances always 
cause their effect by acting in some manner.  
However, to demonstrate that an agent is free at least in deciding to do something 
by exercising his will, Lowe must show that at least in some cases, an agent’s acting 
in some specific manner is not caused. Natural causal powers and liabilities are such 
that the objects possessing them have no choice as to whether or not to exercise or 
manifest them. It follows that if the will is free, it cannot be a species of causal power 
since being free at least means being free to choose among available courses of action. 
As far as I can see, the only argument Lowe could have offered for the freedom of 
will is that we are at least sometimes consciously aware that we are freely exercising 
our will. However, the phenomenological experience of ‘free’ volitions can be 
illusive.3 That I feel my being free or even free to will to do something may not imply 
that I am genuinely free, especially because, according to Lowe, I can exercise my 
will by willing to do A, even if A does not actually occur as a result of my so willing. 
Moreover, even though I am really free in the specified sense, the understanding of 
freedom or free will is quite trivial since it means that being free simply consists in 
                                                        
1 Cf. Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
and Necessity, Volition and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
2 The difficulty was initially indicated by C. D. Broad in Broad (1952), “Determinism, Indeterminism, and 
Libertarianism”, in C. D. Broad, Ethics and the History of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1952). For some 
relevant discussion, see Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes, pp. 74-76. 
3 I will go further to explain this point in due course.  
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being free to will at one’s will, without even specifying what it is to will something.  
Lowe is indeed right to see that being spontaneous is merely a necessary, but not 
a su
ceive of the will as being a power 
that 
                                                       
fficient, condition for the freedom of will. Some inanimate objects can be 
spontaneous without being free since they have no choice as to whether or not to 
exercise or manifest their causal powers. For Lowe, this is an important reason why 
the will cannot be a species of causal power even if it is spontaneous. Since the will is 
a kind of power, it follows that if it is really free, or can be free at least sometimes, it 
must have choice as to whether or not to exercise the power it is supposed to possess. 
Lowe obviously takes choice to be an exercise of the power of will, as he says that 
“willing precisely is choosing a course of action, normally in preference to some other 
course of action”.1 If choice is to be seen as an exercise of the power of will, then it 
seems that we should say that it is by exercising the power of will that the agent 
chooses a course of action in preference to another one. In other words, it cannot be 
the case that choice is made by the will itself. It is more proper to say that choice is 
made by the agent himself in terms of something, even though he does this through 
exercising the power of his will. The will, though construed as a power, cannot by 
itself make a choice without having something that serves as the decisive ground on 
which the agent makes a choice. For Lowe, the will cannot be conceived as a power 
whose exercise is characteristically determined by the causal influence of other 
objects. On the other hand, Lowe is also unwilling to regard the will as a power whose 
manifestations are merely the outcome of chance. He thereby concludes that the will 
can only be conceived as a power that is characteristically exercised in the light of 
reason—that is to say, the will is a rational power. 
I have initially shown that it is incorrect to con
can choose by itself, namely, without depending upon something else. One can, 
of course, decide to make a choice by exercising one’s will on the basis of one’s 
deliberation about relevant reasons. In this case the will is nothing more than the 
power to execute the conclusion of one’s rational deliberation. Lowe does not intend 
to deny this point since he actually takes volition to be the executive element in 
intentional action.2 If the will consists in the power to execute a choice or decision 
after the agent has made such a choice or decision on the basic of his rational 
deliberation, it is also proper to characterize the will as an “active power”. For acting 
on the conclusion of one’s rational deliberation is indeed different from being caused 
to act by some objects external to oneself or their causal influence, in which case 
action can be said to be passive. When an agent acts in response to the demands of 
reason, he can be said to active since his action reflects his recognition of, and 
commitments to, some relevant reasons, by which he can be said to make some active 
contribution to the occurrence of the action. However, it is also evident from this that 
it is not the will as such, but the agent, that is responding to the demands of reason, 
and deliberating on the basis of the reasons which he has recognized and taken as 
relevant. One can indeed exercise one’s will in deciding how to act or whether or not 
to act on the basis of one’s deliberation. But it is a sheer mistake to claim that the will 
 
1 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 155. 
2 Cf. Lowe, Personal Agency, pp. 171-176. 
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“is [by itself] a rational power, that is, a power whose exercises are not only 
spontaneous but also responsive to the demands of reason”.1 Even though Kant does 
sometimes identify the will with pure practical reason and thus takes the will to be 
spontaneous in the sense that it can act merely on the demands of pure reason, he is 
also quite clear that in the case of human agents, the will does not always follow the 
demands of pure reason. This is why Kant comes to distinguish between the will as a 
power of legislation and the will merely as a power of choice and execution. If the 
will had been characterized as a rational power, as in Lowe, there would not be the 
possibility of irrational actions since it is likewise possible that such an action was 
done by an agent through exercising his will.2  
Then, how does Lowe so insist that the will must be a spontaneous and rational 
powe
                                                       
r? Lowe believes, as indicated in the above, that he can succeed in solving the 
problem of free will by combing an agent-causation approach with volitionism. 
However, this cannot be true. To say that some event may be uncaused, according to 
Lowe, is just to say that a substance may sometimes act in a certain manner even 
though it is not the case that any substance (itself included) causes it to act in that 
manner. The claim suggests that it is itself an event that a substance acts in a certain 
manner. If the event in question is not caused, it follows that it is spontaneous that a 
substance acts in a certain manner. However, how can it be that a substance acts in a 
certain manner without being the case that there is something to bring it about? It is 
not implausible to say that acting in a certain manner is itself an event. It does not 
suffice to attempt to explain how such an event happened by saying that it is the agent 
who made that event to happen by directly exercising his will. Why not? In the first 
place, it would be explanatorily trivial to explain the occurrence of such an event in 
this way if any event of this kind occurred as a result of the agent’s directly exercising 
his will. In the second place, if this was how Lowe explains the occurrence of an 
uncaused event, he would fall into the difficulty encountered by classical 
agent-causation theory, namely, that this type of agent-causation theory cannot explain 
why the agent acted in this manner rather than that manner, or why the agent made 
this event rather that event to happen.3 To make his view reasonable, Lowe will have 
to say, as we have seen, that it is in the light of some reasons which the agent may 
have in deliberating about how to act that he acts in this manner rather than that 
manner. Thus we can conclude that for a rational agent, a choice is always made on 
the basis of some reasons. If having a will means being able to choose to act in a 
certain way, and if choice must be understood as being the exercise of a rational 
power,4 it follows, according to Lowe, that the will must be a rational power.  
 
1 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 176. 
nderstanding of ‘acting for a reason’, which will be briefly discussed in what 
ow the problem of luck arises in the case of the classical agent-causal theorist. Randolph Clarke has 
 choice can be irrational.  
2 This is also relevant to Lowe’s u
follows.  
3 This is h
tried to evade the problem by integrating an agent-causal view with a non-deterministic event-causal view. But the 
attempt did not succeed. For my criticisms of O’Connor and Clarke with regard to the problem of luck, see my 
Making Sense of Free Will, pp. 563-604. As for Clarke’s own view, see Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Account of 
Free Will, especially chapters 8 and 9, and Clarke (2005), “Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck”, Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 86: 408-421. Two particularly relevant discussions of this issue are: I. Haji (2003), 
“Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action”, Philosophical Explorations 7: 131-148; Alfred R. Mele, Free 
Will and Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 3. 
4 Whether choice can be understood is obviously questionable since
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The claim that the will is a rational power is, however, ambiguous. If the will is 
the p
cised so as to execute a 
decis
 act for a reason is to act in a way that is responsive to the cogency of certain 
ower to execute the decision which the agent makes on the basis of some reasons, 
then the will can be said to be rational when it does execute the decision in question. 
It can be said to be rational because it executes what the agent takes to be most 
reasonable to do on some given occasion. Precisely speaking, however, in this case, it 
is not the will as such that is rational—instead it is the agent that is rational in 
choosing to so act. If the agent had been subject to the weakness of will, for example, 
he would not have chosen to so act. In fact, if the will was always a rational power, 
the possibility of akrasia would never occur.1 Then in what sense does Lowe assert 
that the will is a rational power? Lowe has initially characterized the will as being 
spontaneous so as to allow the possibility that an agent’s acting in a certain manner 
can be uncaused in the sense specified in the above. However, to escape from the 
difficulty just mentioned in the last paragraph, he has to say that the will is 
characteristically exercised in the light of reason. But saying this is quite different 
from saying that the will is itself a rational power. It is more proper to say that the will 
can, but does not necessarily, follow the demands of reason.  
However, if the will is simply the power that can be exer
ion or choice which one makes on the basis of one’s rational deliberation, Lowe 
would not get what he wants to get. In other words, he cannot consistently advance an 
account of libertarian free agency by combining an agent-causation approach to action 
with volitionism. For a volitionist, it is always by willing that we cause what Lowe 
calls ‘action-results’, for example, arm-rising, when we act freely. Lowe is happy to 
acknowledge that our willings are causes of those events exactly in the 
event-causation sense of ‘cause’. This may be understood as meaning that it is in 
virtue of my willing to raise my arm that I act in a certain way, as a result of which 
my arm rises. Even though my willing to raise my arm is supposedly constitutive of 
my acting in a certain way, my-acting-in-a-certain-way is exactly an event. How could 
such an event have occurred if, according to the libertarian, it must be uncaused in the 
case of a free action? The only answer the libertarian can offer is that it is in virtue of 
my willing to raise my arm that I raise my arm. Moreover, my willing to raise my arm 
must be uncaused if I am to be free to raise my arm. However, for Lowe, saying that 
my willing to do something is uncaused cannot be saying that there is nothing in 
virtue of which I will to do something since he is aware of the difficulty encountered 
by classical agent-causation theory. To avoid the difficulty, he naturally assumes that 
one can will to do something for a reason, or simply that one can act for a reason. This 
move may suggest that acting for a reason can be uncaused and thus free in the 
libertarian sense of free action, as Lowe makes it explicit: 
 
To
considerations in favor of one’s so doing—and this is incompatible with one’s being caused 
to act in that way, because causal processes bring about their effects with complete 
indifference to the question of whether those effects have cogent considerations in their 
                                                        
1 No matter whether akrasia is rational or not, it seems to me that the characterization of the will as a rational 
power a priori rules out the possibility of akrasia, although I will not argue about this point in the paper.  
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favor.1 
 
III 
 
owe’s argument for the claim that acting for a reason must be free in the libertarian 
racterizing the will as being a spontaneous power, Lowe intends to insist 
that 
view
                                                       
L
sense seems to rest on the idea that no substance can be free in acting in a certain way 
if it was caused to act in that way, whether by another substance or even by itself 
acting upon itself. I do believe that being free has something to do with the ability to 
act for reasons. But it seems to me that Lowe is mistaken in attempting to argue for 
this claim by appealing to the notion of an irreducible agent-causation. Let me 
explain.  
In cha
the activity of the will can be uncaused at least in some circumstances. The only 
argument offered by Lowe for this is that one can act for a reason. Lowe goes on to 
argue that acting for a reason is not caused to act on the ground that “to act in the light 
of one’s reasons for acting in this or that way, one must…be able to choose so to act” 
at least in the minimal sense that “one must be able to refrain from choosing to act in 
a certain way”.2 However, even if it is granted that acting for a reason is not caused to 
act, it is possible that when one decided to act in a certain way for a reason, the same 
reason is also the reason for which one refrained from choosing to act in some 
alternative way. If I have taken it to be a decisive reason for me to meet a student this 
afternoon that I have promised to discuss his MA thesis with him this afternoon, then 
this reason is also the reason for which I refrain from choosing to go to museum this 
afternoon. So long as I identify myself with such a reason on the specified occasion, I 
can say that I am free in acting for the reason, even though this means that I will be 
unable to go to museum, and thus miss the last chance to appreciate the impressionist 
exhibition. This kind of freedom does not rest on the possibility that there is at least 
an alternative course of action open to me. Thus, if being free solely consists in acting 
for a certain reason, compatibilists can accept the view of freedom, or even welcome 
it. A compatibilist may go further to say that it does not matter whether my acting in a 
certain way is caused by the mental states involved in my awareness of such a reason 
so long as I have reflectively identified the reason with myself on the specified 
occasion, which may be understood, in a Frankfurtian sense, as meaning that I have 
wholeheartedly endorsed the reason after any rational reflection I can make. To 
distinguish himself from such a compatibilist, Lowe must answer the following 
question: what is so special about acting in the light of a certain reason that it cannot 
be explained in terms of the mental states involved in one’s awareness of the reason?  
To see what answer Lowe can offer to the question, we must turn to examine his 
s on personal agency. Lowe conceives of personal agency as being a special case 
of substance causation with two essential features. First, persons are substances of a 
distinctive kind, with distinctive existence and identity conditions and a characteristic 
range of causal powers and liabilities. Second, and more importantly, persons are also 
 
1 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 156. 
2 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 156. 
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agents with rational powers. Lowe believes that agent-causation is not only 
irreducible but also primary in the sense that causation is fundamentally a matter of 
substances exercising their causal powers to act upon other substances possessing 
causal liabilities. I have no objection to Lowe’s view that persons are psychological 
substances that bear properties, stand in relations to other substances, persist through 
change, and possess distinctive psychological powers such as perception, thought, 
reason and will. Here I also will not argue against the controversial view that the 
biological processes embodied in human persons cannot simply be, or in any way 
constitute, those psychological processes of thought and reasoning, though I believe 
that Lowe’s argument for it is far from convincing. What I want to show is that even if 
we concede his views on personal agency, Lowe has not succeeded in demonstrating 
that it is because we possess such personal agency that we are free in the libertarian 
sense of freedom.  
Lowe is insistent on the libertarian ‘intuition’ that unless there is some room 
betw
erely 
by s
                                                       
een pure chance and causal necessity we will be unlikely to claim that we are the 
authors of our actions. To be the authors of our actions, we must so act that our 
actions are neither mere chance occurrences nor events that are entirely causally 
determined by prior events. In Lowe’s view, if we must accept the dictum that reasons 
are causes, abandoning the idea that there is a fundamental distinction to be drawn 
between causal and rational explanation, then there is no way in which we can be free 
in the libertarian sense. Thus we must conceive of the agent as having an irreducible 
and ineliminable role to play in the generation of free actions. Here the ideas is that 
even if no prior events are causally sufficient for the occurrence of an action, the 
action can be free and yet not a mere chance occurrence since it can result from the 
agent’s exercise of his rational powers. Nobody wants to deny that actions are 
normally generated through one’s agency. Even if I was caused to escape from a tiger 
I encountered in a wild forest, I did this partly through instinctive reactions and partly 
through exercising my agency. It may be said that I was passively exercising my 
agency in this case, and thus not free in taking action to escape from this tiger in the 
sense, which Lowe once mentions, that my action was merely in accordance with 
certain of my reasons for acting, but was not done for a reason.1 If a free action must 
somehow consist in my active exercise of my agency, it seems to follows that 
whenever I act for a reason, I am freely acting. This is exactly what Lowe has in mind 
in talking about free actions since he explicitly conceives of the will as being a power 
that is characteristically exercised in the light of reason, and then identifies the ability 
to act for a reason with the power to choose to act in a certain way.  
However, if Lowe is to argue for the possibility of libertarian free actions m
aying that acting for a reason must be free in the libertarian sense, then his 
conclusion will be unwarranted. Suppose I am aware that there is a reason for my 
acting in a certain way, for example, taking a taxi to go to school before three o’clock 
this afternoon. I have the reason because I have promised a student that I shall meet 
him on the appointed time to discuss his thesis. Then I will act in a certain way, and in 
 
1 Cf. Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 156. However, it seems doubtful that the distinction between acting in 
accordance with a reason and acting for a reason can be sharply drawn. In the example, it is entirely intelligible to 
say that I was rational in taking action to escape from the tiger.  
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so acting I am actively exercising my agency in the sense that no prior events cause 
me to so act and I so act for a reason which is that I have promised to meet the student. 
In this case, however, it is still unclear in what sense I have a libertarian free will in so 
acting. It is true, in this case, that I was not forced to act in a certain way. Instead I 
acted in order to keep my promise which I take to be a good reason for acting in a 
certain way. The compatibilist will say that I was free in acting for such a reason to 
the extent that the reason was not what I was forced to accept and there was nothing 
hindering me from acting in this way. If acting for a reason can be free in the 
compatibilist sense, at least in some circumstances, why does Lowe take pains to 
demonstrate this point by appealing to the notion of agent-causation together with 
volitionism? As far as I can see, the only reason Lowe can have for taking this move 
comes from the claim that the way in which one exercises one’s own agency should 
not be determined by external objects and circumstances because the active exercise 
of one’ own agency is just what the libertarian freedom lies in. Given this, it becomes 
evident why Lowe so closely associates the idea of acting for a reason with the active 
exercise in question.  
It is central to libertarianism that exercises of the will must not be caused by 
prior
                                                       
 events if the will is to be free. Lowe obviously thinks that it is sufficient for the 
will to have libertarian freedom that it is exercised in the light of certain reasons. 
However the notion of a reason for acting is to be construed, about which I will say 
something later on, it is true that in most cases of human actions, we act for a certain 
reason. Then, what is so special about acting for a reason that makes so acting to be 
free in the libertarian sense? To act for a reason is, of course, to act in a certain way. 
But this does nothing to explain the alleged connection between so acting and having 
libertarian freedom. If I have different motives for acting, I will act differently. 
Nevertheless, Lowe may think that the connection can be established by saying that 
“to act in the light of one’s reasons for acting in this or that way, one must… be able 
to choose so to act”.1 It is not particularly clear how the claim is drawn. How can the 
ability to acting for a reason entail or imply the power to choose? If I have some 
different reasons in deliberating about how to act or whether or not to act in a certain 
way, I might make a choice on the basis of my deliberation. If these reasons are in 
some tension or competition, I would have to make appeal to some other (or 
higher-order) reasons to make a choice had I have to make a choice. It is clear from 
this case that if choice should not be random or arbitrary, a choice was always made 
on the basis of one’s deliberation about relevant reasons had it have been made. In 
thinking about whether or not to act or how to act in the light of reasons, one must 
assume that one can choose according to the results of one’s deliberation, otherwise 
one would have no need to deliberate in the light of reasons. However, it is not 
enough to argue that we have libertarian free will simply by saying that being able act 
for a reason presupposes being able to choose to act in a certain way. This is so 
because the view that practical deliberation always presupposes open alternatives is 
neutral with regard to the debate between compatibilism and libertarianism.2 Thus, 
 
1 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 156. 
apitan (1986), “Deliberation and the Presumption of Open Alternatives”, 2 About this point, see Tomis K
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without further argument, Lowe cannot conclude that one does have the libertarian 
power of choice from the mere claim that “one cannot rationally believe that one is 
not in possession of such a power”.1  
In the case of Lowe’s basic actions, to act for a reason is to act in such a way that 
an ac
explained merely by claiming that one can make a free choice by exercising one’s will 
tion-result is caused directly by the agent’s acting in a certain manner which is 
itself uncaused, however. Since acting in a certain manner is par excellence an event, 
it is natural to ask the question of how it can be that it is uncaused. In response, Lowe 
may say that for an agent, having a reason for acting is constitutive of acting in a 
certain way.2 It may be that whenever I have a reason to act, I act in a certain way. 
Then acting for a reason explains, at least to a large extent, how I exercise my agency 
to bring about an action-result. If the interpretation is plausible, it seems to amount to 
saying that no matter whether an action-result has sufficient event-causes or not, it is 
because I have a reason for acting that I act in a certain way so as to bring about the 
action-result, where ‘because’ is to be understood in the sense of a cause. Lowe so 
insists on acting for a reason because he intends to claim that acting for a reason is not 
caused to act in a certain way. In some sense, acting for a reason is exactly not caused 
to act by external objects and circumstances, at least not so directly. But this is still 
insufficient for showing that so acting is not caused by, for example, the agent’s state 
of entertaining the reason for which he acts, together with his exercise of his agency.3 
Lowe may respond that it is not sufficient to explain how an agent acts in a certain 
way to bring about an action-result merely by making reference to the agent’s state of 
entertaining the reason for which he acts. This is so because it is possible that the 
agent might not have acted for the reason, or he might have chosen to act otherwise 
even though he had taken the reason to be decisive on the given occasion. In the first 
case, if the agent did not act for the reason, it may be because he did not regard the 
reason as decisive on the given occasion, or because he was still uncertain whether he 
should act for the reason. In the second case, had he chosen to act otherwise, contrary 
to what he took to be most reasonable to do, he would be acting irrationally. I have no 
intention to deny the possibility of irrational actions. What I want to emphasize is that 
if, in order to insist on his libertarian position, a libertarian would have to claim that 
one could still choose to so act as to violate one’s all-things-considered judgment,4 
libertarianism should be rejected. So acting is worse than being caused to act in the 
way which is nevertheless in accordance with some reason for which one acts 
sometimes. On the other hand, if Lowe asserts that one can still make a choice which 
is free and yet not random merely by exercising one’s will even when one is faced 
with two competing reasons which happen to have the same weight, he has left 
libertarian freedom in mystery. The possibility of libertarian freedom cannot be 
                                                                                                                                                               
Philosophical Quarterly 36: 230-251.  
1 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 157. 
2 Here, to avoid unnecessary complications, I will assume that the reason for which the agent acts in a certain way 
is his decisive reason for so acting.   
3 This may be dropped down since any significant action is done by exercising one’s own agency. 
4 This is exactly what Lowe has done in discussing a thought experiment suggested by Peter van Inwagen. In 
trying to refute the conclusion van Inwagen draws from the experiment, Lowe declares that “a libertarian should 
happily accept that our freedom to choose is a freedom even to choose irrationally” (Lowe, p. 193). Cf. Peter van 
Inwagen (2002), “Free Will Remains a Mystery”, Philosophical Perspectives 14: 1-19.  
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even when one has no reason to exercise one’s will in a certain way.  
It is not intuitively implausible to understand the will as the disposition to 
execute a decision for action according to something. So construed, the will does not 
have
atisfied while 
insis
                                                       
 the power Lowe ascribes to it to execute a decision spontaneously.1 Even if the 
will cannot be identified with desire or want as such at least to the extent that it can 
take the latter to be its objects, it must be for its exercise dependent on something 
(some consideration or reason, for example). Thus it cannot be right, or it does not 
make sense, to talk about freedom of the will per se. If we have to continue to use the 
conventional term ‘free will’, it is more adequate to take it to mean ‘freedom to form 
one’s volition’. How to understand the expression is obviously dependent on how to 
understand the notion of freedom in the first place. If one does not believe in the 
possibility of libertarian freedom, one may be disposed to relate the notion of freedom 
to that of autonomy, and then approach the problem of autonomy along the line 
suggested by some compatibilism-oriented theorists.2 It is unnecessary to deal with 
this issue here, and it is enough to point out that the phenomenology of willing, 
intending and acting intentionally makes it clear that in discussing ‘freedom to form 
one’s volition’, we must take into account the processes by which any given choice, 
decision, or volition is formed. It turns out that libertarian agent-causal theorists are 
not more successful than their opponents in this regard.3 In fact, in asserting that an 
agent still could make a free and yet non-chancy choice by ‘actively’ exercising his 
agency even in the circumstance where he had no further reason to break the balanced 
state of two competing reasons for acting, the libertarian has presupposed the 
possibility of libertarian freedom. Moreover, even if one can occasionally have such 
experience, this is not sufficient for establishing the existence of libertarian freedom. 
This can be explicated as follows. If there is a gap between reasons for making a 
decision and making the decision, or between the decision and starting to act so that 
we don’t feel that the prior causes of the next conscious state sets causally sufficient 
conditions for it, then our experience of the gap disposes us to believe that we are 
free.4 If our belief in freedom or free will is indeed drawn from such experience, then 
we can believe that we have freedom or free will even in a deterministic world since 
such a world does not rule out such experience. In fact, in such a world, we do have 
such experience in virtue of ignorance or epistemic uncertainty. Thus there is no 
reason to think that such experience just suggests libertarian freedom.  
I suspect that Lowe’s preoccupation with libertarian freedom has brought his 
whole argument into a circle. If one has rejected compatibilism as uns
ting on the possibility of libertarian freedom, one is disposed to maintain that 
 
1 Even if Thomas Reid is often seen as a libertarian, which is in my view wrong, Reid did not understand the will 
in this way. Cf. my “Thomas Reid on Active Power and Free Agency”, unpublished manuscript.  
2 For example, Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), and Bratman, Structure of Agency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Harry Frankfurt (1988) 
and (1999); Alfred R. Mele, Autonomous Agents (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), and Mele, 
Motivation and Agency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
3 For example, see Alfred R. Mele, Free Will and Luck, pp. 53-75, for his insightful criticisms of T. O’Connor and 
R. Clarke.  
4 Cf. John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), p. 62. See also John Searle, 
Freedom and Neurobiology (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 42. It is worth indicating that even if 
Searle rightly identifies the phenomenology of feeling freedom, he gives a mistaken and misleading account of it. 
See my Making Sense of Free Will, pp. 611-615. 
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there must be some room between causal necessity and mere chance so that the 
problem of free can be solved in an intelligible way. This is in fact what motivates the 
agent-causation approach to the problem since agent-causal theorists generally believe 
that the specified requirement can be satisfied by appealing to the notion of 
agent-causation. For example, in Timothy O’Connor’s theory, reasons are said to have 
a tendency-conferring character: so long as an agent is already aware of a certain 
reason for action or choice, he is disposed to take the action or make the choice, and 
yet does not necessarily to do so. By appealing to the structured influence of reasons, 
O’Connor intends to explain why the agent can have some degree of control over 
what he does. On the other hand, given that the influence does not necessarily 
determine the agent’s action, it is still completely up to him which action or choice he 
will make, and thus he is still free in the sense. 1  Appeal to the notion of 
agent-causation seems to give the libertarian all of what he wants to get. However, if 
the structured influence of reasons does not necessarily dispose the agent to make a 
choice, it is at least unclear that the choice which the agent actually made is not a 
chancy one. Lowe seems explicitly to be aware of the difficulty. Thus he attempts to 
explain how the agent has control over the way in which he exercises his power of 
free choice in terms of the idea of acting for reasons. Lowe believes that we would not 
have genuine control over our actions if our actions were causally determined for us 
by prior events. It follows, according to Lowe, that “it is because we have a power of 
choice which we can exercise freely—that is, a power of choice whose exercises are 
not causally determined by prior events—that we have control over our actions.”2 It 
may be true that if we were not causally determined to exercise the power in question, 
we had control over what we did in exercising the power. Would this show that we 
were also free in exercising the power? For Lowe, the answer is certainly positive. 
However, he can give a positive answer simply because he has straightforwardly 
defined uncaused actions (in the sense of event-causation) as being free.3 
Now the question is this: can Lowe go further to explain why uncaused actions in 
the sense of event-causation must be free? Lowe incessantly insists that no action that 
is ca
                                                       
usally determined for us by prior events can be free. Being so caused to act is not 
acting freely probably because so acting does not reflect our rational agency at all. 
This is indeed a reasonable claim at least from a Kantian point of view. Thus I will not 
debate whether the distinction Lowe draws between ‘the world of causes’ and ‘the 
world of reasons’, which is central to his solution to the problem of free will, is sound, 
despite the fact that it seems be making a wholly ad hoc move to solve the problem by 
introducing the distinction. Here it is enough to point out that even if free agency just 
consists in the agent’s exercising his power of choice in the light of reasons so as to 
bring about an event, the processes by which he forms a reason may be causally 
determined. I might not have chosen to buy some brand of coffee bean in a 
supermarket if I had not perceived it. It is true that the perception alone was not 
sufficient for my decision to buy this kind of coffee bean since it is my preference for 
 
1 See Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes, pp. 95-101.  
2 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 195. 
3 Here it is worth indicating that any specific exercise of the power on a given occasion is itself an action, though 
an agent-caused action.  
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this kind of coffee bean that played a leading motivating role in the decision. But it is 
also true that without the perceptual input I would not have made the decision, and 
thus it made a causal contribution to the decision. Then was I free in making the 
decision? Lowe might respond that I could be free in this regard on the ground that 
even if I had been disposed to buy that kind of coffee bean, I could have acted 
otherwise, or more generally speaking, that however reasons for which I am to act are 
formed, I can freely choose to act in the light of some reason. How can I freely choose 
to act in the light of some reason among alternative reasons if not on the basis of my 
further consideration of that reason or some relevant reasons? This question is central 
to Lowe’s argument under discussion since he insists, probably in order to avoid the 
charge of luck, that “choice, by its very nature, is never exercised ‘blindly’, but is 
always informed by or responsive to reasons for action”.1 If any choice is always 
made in this way, why not straightforwardly say that choice is determined by the 
agent’s final reason that is to be construed as the one at which the agent has arrived 
after his rational deliberation?  
It turns out that the question turns is crucial to clarifying the very nature of 
Lowe’s project of solving the freewill problem. As indicated in the above, for a 
comp
 exercising the alleged power of choice? It is not sufficient to 
answ
                                                       
atibilist, a choice can be free to the extent that the agent has reflectively 
endorsed the reasons on which the choice is made. It does not matter, for such a 
compatibilist, whether or not we should regard the choice as determined by those 
reasons together with the agent’s rational deliberation about them, which is by and 
large a matter of convention. To distinguish himself from such a compatibilist, Lowe 
will have to say that even though one had made such a choice, one still could have 
chosen otherwise. But how one could have chosen otherwise in this case is just what 
the libertarian need to explain—he cannot only assert this, nor is it sufficient to 
merely claim that the phenomenology of our choice tells us that we have libertarian 
freedom of choice. To explain how we can control the way in which we exercise our 
power of choice, Lowe must assume that any choice is always made by what I just 
call ‘a final reason’.2  
If any choice is always made in this way, what role is agent-causation supposed 
to play in the process of
er the question by saying that it is the agent who makes a choice by exercising 
his own agency. For being caused to act in a certain way also involves exercising 
one’s own agency, though perhaps not in an active manner. Nor can Lowe can answer 
the question in the way O’Connor conceives, namely, by arguing that even when no 
reason determines an agent to act, the agent can still choose to act in a certain way by 
exercising his active power. For if Lowe is to argue in this way, not only does his 
insistence on acting for reason become explanatorily unnecessary, but he also will 
 
1 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 194. 
2 As he makes it explicit: “It does not make sense…to think of an agent as choosing between two or more possible 
courses of action without being aware of any consideration whatever in favor of carrying out any of them” (p. 194). 
If I am faced a choice between two courses of action for which equally good reasons seems to present themselves, 
and yet I have to make a choice, I may do this either arbitrarily or on the basis of some felt disposition. In the 
former case, I will not think that my choice was made on any reason—I simply had to make it with some feeling of 
regret. In the later case, it may be that I could not explicitly find what the felt disposition came from in making a 
choice.   
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leave unexplained how the exercise of one’s agency is free, as explicated in the above. 
In thinking about how to choose, if I come to find that I have a final reason for 
making a choice, then I will make the choice to the extent that I am rational. The only 
role that can be ascribed to agent-causation is that of exercising one’s own agency so 
as to carry out the decision to make a choice according to one’s commitment to the 
final reason or one’s recognition of its reason-giving force. Moreover, if choice is 
always made in the light of a final reason, which is in a fact an all-things-considered 
reason in a given circumstance, it must be the case that it is because a choice is by its 
very nature such that the agent decides to carry out the choice. Then to act for a final 
reason is to decide to act in a certain way in virtue of the agent’s recognition of the 
reason’s reason-giving force. This helps explain Lowe’s intuition that from the 
first-personal point of view, the “I” as the subject of action is indeed ineliminable. But 
this is not because, as Lowe thinks, the agent will ‘disappear’ once we deny that there 
is a fundamental distinction to be drawn between causal and rational explanation. 
Instead this is because it is the agent who recognizes the reason-giving force of a 
reason, and who acts in the light of such a reason.  
We are now in a position to see why Lowe’s argument for the distinction in 
question is not well-founded. Lowe resists seeing reasons for acting as consisting of 
the one’s beliefs and desires on the ground that acting out of one’s beliefs and desires 
is caused to act. He holds this view because he thinks that whatever beliefs and 
desires we have, we are caused to have them. But this is surely incorrect. Many 
desires we have are not unmotivated desires, to use a term from Thomas Nagel.1 
Instead they are formed on the basis of some reasons or considerations. In spite of the 
fact, desires cannot be identified with those reasons or considerations since desire is 
said to have the direction of fit from the mind to the world. On the other hand, it is 
true that I will probably have to hold a belief once I have been presented with 
sufficient evidence for the belief. But to say this is not to say that a belief is always 
formed passively. One can surely take efforts to seek relevant evidence for or against 
a belief, or make sure whether or not what one believes is true or most likely to be 
true. Lowe is right to see that it is not one’s belief and desire as such, but the content 
of one’s belief and desire, that can constitute one’s reason for acting in a certain way. 
But I take it to be evident that it is insufficient for explaining how an action comes to 
happen merely to mention the content of one’s belief and desire without making 
reference to one’s mental states of believing and desiring. However Lowe understands 
a reason for acting,2 it is at least the case that only if one comes to believe that some 
reason is really the reason for which one is to act in a certain way, can one act on the 
reason. If reasons for action are in fact facts or states of affairs, as Lowe says, how 
can one act for a reason without having cognitive access to it in the first place and 
then tying it to one’s some state of volition (for example, some state of desiring)?3 
                                                        
1 Cf. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 29ff. 
ompletely 
 is to be that for which one acts. However, the 
2 He follows Jonathan Dancy to take reasons for action to be facts or states of affairs, which cannot be c
right, in my view. I have no space to discuss the issue in the paper. For a general discussion of reasons for action 
which is especially focused on my criticism of Dancy, see my Moral Philosophy and Practical Reason (Beijing: 
The Commercial Press, 2006), chapter 4. For Dancy’s externalist view about reasons for action, see Jonathan 
Dancy, Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
3 Lowe does concede that one must be aware of a reason if a reason
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This is not to say that a reason for action can be simply identified with a state of the 
agent as involved when he is aware of such a reason. For it is surely necessary to hold 
that reasons for action are, in some epistemic sense, independent of the agent’s mental 
states so that the distinction between rational and irrational actions can be drawn. 
However, whether an action is rational or not does not merely depend on conceiving 
of reasons for action in this way; instead it also depends on whether the agent himself 
is rational in holding a belief and a desire on which he acted. If an agent does not 
really believe that he has a putative reason for action, for instance, it will be irrational 
for him to act on that reason. If belief and desire do have different directions of fit so 
that the essential motivating role which desire has in the generation of an action 
cannot be replaced by whatever is purely cognitive, it follows that the Humean theory 
of reasons for action is substantively right.1 Thus it seems safe to conclude that even 
if one’s belief and desire may not be sufficient for one to act in a certain way, they are 
at least necessary if one does already take an action.  
Lowe may put forward two interrelated objections to what I just said in the above. 
In the first place, Lowe may argue that to be caused to act in a certain way by certain 
of one’s beliefs and desires is not consistent with one’s acting rationally. This is not 
generally true, however. Suppose I believe that it is desirable to keep my promise to a 
student to the effect that I shall meet him this afternoon to discuss his essay. Then I 
take a taxi to go to my office in school. My action is obviously rational. What is at 
issue is whether it makes sense to say that my action is caused by the belief together 
with the desire that I want to keep my promise. Answer to the question is ‘yes’ at least 
to the extent that some counterfactual analysis of causation is acceptable.2 An action 
can be rational so long as the belief and desire on which one acts are rational. For 
example, a belief is formed on the basis of some reasons or considerations, and a 
desire is consistent with one’s rational commitment to some values. In this case, it is 
not necessary, as Lowe insists, to say that one acts ‘in the light of’ one’s belief and 
desire since saying this is nothing more than saying that one takes oneself to be 
rational in acting from one’s belief and desire. However, even though it is by making 
reference to the content of my belief and desire that why my so acting is rationally 
explained, the action would not have happened without, for instance, my desiring to 
keep my promise to a student, and believing that by taking a taxi to go to school I 
would be able to keep my promise. If keeping one’s promise is a reason for acting in a 
certain way, it may be sufficient for explaining the rationality of my action by 
appealing to the fact that I have made a promise of some form. However, even though 
I had been aware of this fact, I might have not acted or chosen to act in the specified 
way because, for example, I did not believe that I could go to school before the 
assigned time by taking a taxi, given the present traffic situation. It is also possible 
that I might be unable to establish some connection by deliberation between my aware 
of the fact (which is, according to Lowe, a reason or can serve as a reason) and my 
                                                                                                                                                               
expression ‘being aware of a reason’ seems to me too vague to serve the purpose of explaining actions.  
1 For a detailed argument for this point, see Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 
101-125. Smith goes further to argue that even normative reasons must be subject to the Humean analysis of 
reasons for action. 
2 Lowe does not offer any substantive analysis of causation in the book I am discussing.  
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motivational system. It seems to me that any reason for action must be ultimately 
analyzed in terms of Bernard Williams’ model of internal reasons.1 Even if it makes 
sense to say that I act ‘in the light of’ my beliefs and desires, it is simply because it is 
‘I’ who holds these beliefs and desires, and thus becomes the subject who acts in a 
certain way.  
In the second place, Lowe may argue that any causal theory of action is 
susce
                                                       
ptible to the problem of deviant causal chains, and thus deemed to be 
inappropriate. The agent-causation approach to action is partly inspired by an attempt 
to deal with the problem.2 However, there is no reason to think that the problem is in 
principle insolvable.3 In fact, Davidson has suggested the basic idea for solving the 
problem when he says that “central to the relation between a reason and an action it 
explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason”.4 
In other words, the agent’s rationalizations must not be a mere rationalization. In 
Davidson’s view, a mere rationalization by itself “provides no reason for saying that 
one suitable belief-desire pair rather than another (which may well also have been 
present in the agent) did the causing”.5 It is for the reason that Davidson insists that 
causal relation must be brought into play in order to single out, among the reasons the 
agent had, the one which was effective in bringing about his behavior. Of course, 
Davidson does not go on to specify the conditions required to eliminate the deviant 
cases except by insisting that the effect must be brought about in the right way. Given 
Davidson’s commitment to the holism and the normative character of the mental, this 
is completely intelligible. For the holism and the normative character of the mental 
implies that there are no strict intentional laws and psychophysical laws. However, 
specifying conditions for a normal course of events that deviant chains deviate would 
be amount to establishing such a law. Whether or not Davidson is right in this regard 
is not what concerns me here. However, it is interesting to note that Lowe is faced 
with a similar problem. An agent might have been aware of various reasons in acting 
in a certain way. Thus it is natural to ask for which reason he actually so acted. In 
response, Lowe cannot say that the reason for which he actually acted was the one 
that actually moved him to so act, namely, the one that caused him to so to act. For, in 
his view, being caused to act by certain of one’s beliefs and desires is not acting for a 
reason. The only answer Lowe can offer to the question is that the reason for which 
the agent acted is the reason which he chose to act upon. In Lowe’s words, “by 
 
1 See Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons”, reprinted in Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101-113, and Williams, “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame”, 
reprinted in Williams, Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-45. For 
my own interpretation of Williams’ notion of internal reasons, see my Moral Philosophy and Practical Reason, pp. 
193-215. 
2 See, for example, John Bishop (1983), “Agent-Causation”, Mind 92: 61-78. 
3 For some proposals for solving the problem, see Robert Audi, “Acting for Reason” and Alfred Mele and Paul 
Moser, “Intentional Action”, both reprinted in Alfred Mele (ed.), The Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); Alfred Mele (1987), “Intentional Actions and Wayward Causal Chains: The Problem of 
Tertiary Waywardness”, Philosophical Studies 51: 55-60; Thalberg (1984), “Do Our Intentions Cause Our 
Intentional Actions”, American Philosophical Quarterly 21: 249-260. A promising attempt may be made on the 
basis of Michael Bratman’s theory of extended agency.  
4 Donald Davidson (1963), “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, reprinted in Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 9. 
5 Donald Davidson (1987), “Problems in the Explanation of Action”, in P. Pettit, R. Sylvan and J. Norman (eds.), 
Metaphysics and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 35-49, quoted on p. 42. 
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choosing to act in a certain way in the light of a given reason, the agent makes that 
reason the reason for which he acted on that occasion”.1 However, how could the 
agent choose to act in a certain way in the light of a given reason if not because he 
had recognized the reason-giving force of the reason? If so, it makes no sense, as I 
have argued in the above, to say that it is through the agent’s mental act of free choice 
that he “makes that reason the reason for which he acted”. Even if to choose in the 
light of a given reason is to choose freely, the understanding of free choice can be 
accepted by a compatibilist, as I have argued before. On the other hand, suppose that 
Lowe is to stick to the libertarian conception of free choice so as to insist that even 
when the agent found himself having no reason to choose to act, or having most 
reason to choose to act in a certain way, he still could choose to act in a certain way, 
or have chosen to act otherwise, through his mental act of free choice. Then either 
Lowe has abandoned the essential connection he deliberately establishes between 
being free to act and acting for reasons, or he has presupposed the possibility of 
libertarian free choice without explaining how it is possible.     
 
IV 
 
entral to Lowe’s approach to free agency is the claim that if choices are to play the 
 have to pay some price to make the strategy of argument 
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role Lowe assigns to them in rational action, they must be uncaused and thus free in 
the libertarian sense. Lowe makes two crucial moves to argue in support of the claim. 
In the first place, he argues that acting for a reason is not caused to act. In the second 
place, he goes on to argue that if a choice had been actually made, it was made by the 
agent through exercising the agent’s power of choice in the light of a final reason. 
Then appeal to reasons in choice-making seems to serve to show why an uncaused 
action—in Lowe’s case, typically, the action of making a choice by exercising one’s 
power of choice—is free and yet not a merely chancy occurrence. In this way Lowe 
seems, as he takes it, to avoid the problem of luck with which other agent-causation 
theorists have been faced.  
However, Lowe would
ork. To act for a reason is supposed to act completely through exercising the 
agent’s own agency, in spite of the causal influence imposed by prior events on the 
agent, which captures a sense in which action can be free. However, if being free to 
act just consists, as it seems according to Lowe, in acting out of the agent’s rational 
recognition of the practical necessity of so acting, it is not clear, in the very least, why 
a compatibilist cannot accept the understanding of freedom. In fact, I suspect that 
when attempting to explain the possibility of free choice in this way, Lowe seems to 
have confused autonomy with free will. But most libertarians are quite unwilling to 
identify free will with autonomy while at least some compatibilists welcome the 
identification.2 On the other hand, if Lowe argues that the agent still could have 
chosen otherwise even when the agent had been aware of the practical necessity of 
choosing in a certain way, he is assuming without argument that libertarian freedom is 
 
1 Lowe, Personal Agency, p. 183. 
2 For an account of why free will is a different matter from autonomy, see Marina A. L. Oshana, “Autonomy and 
Free Agency”, especially pp. 184-192.  
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already possible. It does not suffice to establish the possibility in question merely by 
appealing to the phenomenology of choosing since we can, as I have argued in the 
above, have experience of free choice even when living a completely deterministic 
world. Moreover, if Lowe’s account of free agency is essentially based on the idea of 
acting for reasons, it is unclear what role the notion of agent-causation is supposed to 
play in his approach. The ‘I’ as the subject of agency is indeed ineliminable from the 
first-personal point of view in the generation of any action. But this does not show 
that agent-causation cannot be further explained in terms of the fact that it is because 
the agent entertains a certain reason and recognizes the reason-giving force of the 
reason through deliberation that the agent chooses to act in the way in which the agent 
did. Nor does Lowe’s account of the alleged primacy of substance-causation succeed 
in showing that it must be the case.  
Despite my critique of Lowe, it does not imply that there are no plausible ideas 
implicit in his approach to free agency. Lowe has certainly made an important 
advance in relating the idea of being free to act/choose to that of acting/choosing for 
reasons. This seems to me on the right track if any adequate understanding of human 
freedom must take into account the value of being free, which cannot simply consist 
in being able to choose even when there is no reason to choose. If acting for a reason 
can be, as I believe, taken to mean acting through recognizing the reason-giving of 
this reason, then such an action can be free in the sense that the ground for performing 
the action is originated from the agent. This seems to be Lowe’s view. However, it is 
also clear that the understanding of free agency does not necessarily rule out the case 
in which the agent can be free in acting from some of the agent’s beliefs and desires to 
the extent that the agent has rationally endorsed the belief and desire on which the 
agent acted. Without such reflective endorsement, it would be impossible that the 
agent can be said to free to act even in acting form a reason. This is so especially 
because Lowe endorses Jonathan Dancy’s externalist theory of reasons for acting. 
This seems to me quite odd since he is apparent to insist on some connection between 
being free to choose and being autonomous, no matter whether he is right in doing so. 
Since we live in such a world in which we are everywhere and anytime subject to 
causal impacts from it, it is mistaken and unnatural to assume that there is some 
absolute separation between ‘the space of causes’ and ‘the space of reasons’, and go 
on to claim a priori that only acting for a reason can be free because so acting is 
uncaused. It is more proper to say that we come to learn to act in the light of reasons 
in such a way that we gradually escape from the mere causal determination of our 
actions by prior events. However, it is not that we can be free by choosing, through 
some mysterious power of choice, not to be subject to such causal influence since we 
are in fact subject to such influence. Instead it is that we can be free because we are 
capable of deciding how to act or whether or not to act on the basis of our rational 
deliberations. Determinism may make libertarian freedom impossible. But what is at 
issue is whether we must accept the libertarian conception of freedom in order to have 
the freedom we do value as living in the real world. The conclusion is that we do not 
have to.          
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